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Abstract
We argue that, to be trustworthy, Computa-
tional Intelligence (CI) has to do what it is
entrusted to do for permissible reasons and
to be able to give rationalizing explanations
of its behavior which are accurate and gras-
pable. We support this claim by drawing par-
allels with trustworthy human persons, and we
show what difference this makes in a hypo-
thetical CI hiring system. Finally, we point out
two challenges for trustworthy CI and sketch
a mechanism which could be used to gener-
ate sufficiently accurate as well as graspable
rationalizing explanations for CI behavior.
1 Trustworthiness in Humans
For a human person to be trustworthy, she not only
has to be competent at the action or decision we trust
her with, but also to be appropriately motivated so to
act or to decide (McLeod, 2015). To take an example
from Kant (1997), the honest merchant who never
cheats his customers because he worries about his
reputation is someone his customers can rely on to
be honest. He isn’t trustworthy, however, for he is
motivated by self-interest, not by goodwill or moral
considerations. The trustworthy person is someone
who has a disposition to act in a way that warrants
our trust in her, for she does what we entrusted her
to do for the right reasons.
Importantly, to maintain another’s reasonable
trust, a person has to be able to explain the motives
of her actions. Imagine that you break a promise
to help your friend move. This might cause her to
stop trusting you—but you may avoid this result if
you explain to her that you were committed to help-
ing, but that you had to take your father to the hos-
pital. Note that this explanation only adds to your
trustworthiness if it is not a made-up excuse, but an
accurate account of why you didn’t do as promised,
i.e., an account of your actual reasons.
2 Lessons for Trustworthy CI
These considerations make the following opera-
tionalization plausible: A CI system is fully trust-
worthy if and only if it (1) generally does compe-
tently what it is entrusted to do, (2) it does so for
permissible reasons, (3) it is able to explain its ac-
tions1 by reference to the reasons for which it acted,
and (4) its explanations are accurate. Here, we will
focus on conditions (2) to (4).
2.1 Rationalizing Explanations
What kind of explanation is sufficient to make trust-
ing a CI system reasonable? To support our claims
that we need explanations that appeal to reasons for
which the system acted as it did (or rationalizing ex-
planations), take the example of an automated hiring
system used by a bank. Imagine that it ranks a young
black woman at the bottom of the list of applicants.
What would it take for her to reasonably trust that
the system’s decision was fair?
Clearly, an explanation in terms of a subsymbolic
execution protocol2 leading up to the decision—
though it may be a true causal explanation—is
1Decisions are included under actions in this paper.
2Depending on the implementation of the subsymbolic CI
system, we can obtain protocols of different forms. For in-
stance, for a neural network we can obtain a protocol in terms
of a description of all neurons and a trace of all signals.
1
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beside the point, for it can’t help her determine
whether the decision was fair/morally permissible.
Rather, what is needed is a rationalizing explanation
of the system’s decision (Davidson, 1963), which
makes the decision rationally intelligible. Ratio-
nalizing explanations appeal to the goals that the
system pursues—sorting the applicants in order of
qualification—and the information that it used to
determine how to achieve its goals—e.g. the appli-
cants’ prior work experience. Taken together, expla-
nations that appeal to the system’s goals and infor-
mation, i.e., to the reasons for which it acted, may
increase its trustworthiness. In the example, if the
system’s explanation of its decision includes the in-
formation that the young black woman lacked the
requisite work experience, she will be able to un-
derstand what motivated it and that its decision was
indeed permissible.
2.2 Accurate and Permissible Explanations
Moreover, CI systems need to give accurate ratio-
nalizing explanations to be trustworthy. A system
that gives an ‘explanation’ distinct from what actu-
ally drove its decision is not deserving of our trust.
Imagine that the automated hiring system ex-
cluded the young black woman not because she
lacked relevant work experience, but because it is bi-
ased against people of color (Caliskan et al., 2017).
If the system explains its decision by giving reasons
that were causally irrelevant to the decision but make
it appear permissible, there is a reason for the appli-
cant to reduce her trust in it. By contrast, if an ac-
curate explanation of what led up to its decision is
provided in terms of its mistaken informational state
that people of color are less qualified for the job (its
bias), this will have less negative impact on the ma-
chine’s trustworthiness. If we can trust that a system
accurately explains its actions, we have no reason
to believe that it is ‘covering up’ its impermissible
decisions or actions.3
So, accurate rationalizing explanations may be
given for actions that are impermissible and still
make them intelligible to the persons affected.
That there were certain reasons for which the sys-
3An accurate explanation that reveals that the system’s ac-
tion is impermissible may also allow us to reduce its negative
impact on us. Further, accurate explanations enable the sys-
tem’s engineers to improve it.
tem acted doesn’t mean these were good reasons.
Whether a CI system’s action is permissible hinges
on whether the reasons for which it was performed
were permissible. To determine whether the action
was permissible or not, a person then needs an accu-
rate explanation of what motivated it.
We can distinguish moral (im)permissibility from
practical (im)permissibility. A reason for which a
CI system acted is morally permissible just in case
it violates no moral requirements. It is practically
permissible to the extent that actions motivated by
it contribute to achieving what the CI system was
designed to achieve.
2.3 Graspable Explanations
Further, we need CI systems to give explanations we
can grasp. Assume that a system has identified a
property which makes an applicant who has it the
perfect employee. Its concept of the property—call
it ‘blagh’—is beyond our understanding. The CI
system might accurately rationalize its decision by
pointing out that the top applicant has blagh. Unfor-
tunately, even so, we are unable to understand it, as
we do not possess the concept blagh.4
2.4 Three Dimensions of Explanations
Following the insights from 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, we
can, aside from the kind of an explanation—merely
causal vs. rationalizing—, identify the following di-
mensions of an explanation:
Accuracy: An explanation of an action is accurate
if and only if it appeals to what actually led to
the action. A rationalizing explanation is accu-
rate if and only if it appeals to the goals and
information that actually led to the action.5
Permissibility: An explanation is permissible if
and only if the action so explained violates no
moral or practical requirement. Practical re-
quirements are given by the purposes for which
a CI system is designed.6
4Cf. (Armstrong et al., 2012) and (Weinberger, 2017).
5As this goes to show, rationalizing explanations are a
species of causal explanation.
6We have to leave to one side difficulties arising from the
fact that the same action can be described in different ways. See
(Anscombe, 1962). Putting these in, we get: An explanation E
is permissible iff the action explained by it under a description
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Graspability: An explanation is graspable for some
person P if and only if the explanation makes
use only of concepts P can grasp.
To be ideally trustworthy, a CI system needs to
provide us with a rationalizing explanation which is
accurate, graspable, and permissible.
3 Two Challenges for CI Trustworthiness
But how do we connect this result to the actual work-
ings of CI systems? We use an example of a sim-
ple mechanism that sorts integers to illustrate two
challenges in designing trustworthy CI systems. Let
sort be an arbitrary but correct sorting mechanism
for lists of integers. For instance, an invocation of
sort on input [3, 5, 0] gives output [0, 3, 5].
How can we explain this output? Rationalizing
explanations appeal to the goals that the system pur-
sues and the information that it used to determine
how to achieve them. A goal can be understood in
terms of a specification of desired outputs, given an
input. Here is a specification for sort using the stan-
dard model of integers: The successor of each inte-
ger within the output list, if present, is greater-equal
than its predecessor and the output list contains the
same integers as the input list.
3.1 The Permissibility-Accuracy Challenge
The need for goals and information raises the
Permissibility-Accuracy Challenge for CI trustwor-
thiness. We can give a high-level description of the
goal to be set for the system: ‘Choose the best ap-
plicant!’. But—unlike in the case of the sort—we
don’t know what exactly our high-level description
means in terms of an input/output specification. By
training the system we hope that it develops its own
conception of the characteristics of a good applicant.
This is what makes CI systems so powerful, but also
what makes them problematic. For we cannot be
sure whether a system is trained with our intended
goals. Nor can we know for certain what informa-
tion guides its action, so we cannot be sure whether
its actual goals and information are permissible. To
achieve trustworthiness for CI systems, then, we
need to gain access to the actual goals and the infor-
mation, or at least to know whether they really are
matching the explanation violates no moral or practical require-
ment.
permissible. As argued in Sect. 2.2, for establish-
ing trust, it is insufficient to have some permissible
explanation of the decision in question that doesn’t
reflect the actual decision-making process.
3.2 The Graspability-Accuracy Challenge
Next, it should be possible to infer from a protocol
of the internal processing of the system to the infor-
mation used by it to achieve its goal. In case of a
classical sorting algorithm, the protocol consists of
the individual symbolic steps executed.
By contrast, subsymbolic protocols of the internal
processing of CI systems are not protocols of sym-
bolic steps executed within the system, correspond-
ing to, for instance, concepts of integer comparison
or arithmetic. Rather, they provide accurate merely
causal explanations, but are useless for providing ra-
tionalizing explanations. For we cannot make much
sense of information presented in such monolithic
form. This constitutes the second challenge for CI
trustworthiness: We need to be able to extract or in-
fer the information which determined the result, but
also the system’s actual goals, in terms of concepts
we can grasp. As before, trustworthiness requires
more than just some graspable though made-up ex-
planation.
4 How to Meet the Challenges
To achieve CI trustworthiness, we need to tackle the
two challenges: acquire rationalizing explanations
which are both accurate—particularly with respect
to their permissibility status—and graspable. In the
following we will sketch, in a ‘black box’ kind of
way, a mechanism that could be used to generate
such explanations for CI behavior.
Formally, an accurate rationalizing explanation E
consists of a set of goals G and the information
which is used to determine how to achieve these
goals Λ, i.e., E := 〈G,Λ〉. Furthermore E appeals
to a model ME which provides the concepts used
within the explanation.7 Moreover, let C denote
some CI system, trained with some data D, result-
ing in an internal inaccessible model M and goals
G. Let OI be the output generated by C on some
7Think of the model as including the general information
about the world the system possesses, which is coached in the
concepts possessed by the system.
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input I . E explains OI with respect to I if and only
if it makes the output rationally intelligible.
To obtain an accurate and graspable rationalizing
explanation E (or something close enough) we pro-
pose the following mechanism:
First, we need to build a Confabulator. Given
solely an input/output series, it constructs explana-
tory hypotheses, i.e., candidate goals GC and corre-
sponding candidate explanations EC := 〈GC ,ΛC〉
appealing to a candidate model MC which is gras-
pable, i.e., contains only concepts we can grasp,
which makes EC graspable as well.8 The result-
ing candidate explanations ignore the inaccessible
actual internal model M and the actual goals G. For
instance, for sort, we can obtain candidate explana-
tions E1 and E2 based on the standard model of in-
tegersMN and a candidate goal, which is in this case
the specification S, given above:
E1 : 〈S, 0 < 3; 3 < 5〉 E2 : 〈S, 0 < 3; 5 > 3〉
The Confabulator’s candidate explanations have a
serious shortcoming: If they are accurate at all, this
is pure luck. How do we know whether MN and the
relations of greater-than and less-than play any role
in the actual decision making process? Say the can-
didate are constructed based on a series of input lists
already sorted in reverse order—if so, the mecha-
nism could equally well have the goal of reversing
lists instead of sorting them. Typically, for actual
CI systems, we don’t even have any specification at
hand and, thus, don’t know the goals. The same goes
for the automated hiring system. Here, the Confab-
ulator need to guess—or learn—the goals.
Generally, there can be multiple, mutually exclu-
sive candidate explanations which explain the same
input/output series by appeal to different goals and
models, where only some of these candidate expla-
nations are permissible. We call this phenomenon
explanatory underdetermination. This can be a se-
vere problem, e.g., there may be multiple candidate
explanations of the applicant ranking, of which only
some are permissible, and at the same time we are
unable to verify the system directly, for we lack a
specification.
8The Confabulator may consist of human experts, of some
additional system with or without access to the system under
consideration, or be part of the CI system itself.
Figure 1: The configuration and interplay of a CI system with
Extractor, Confabulator and Matchmaker.
This is where the second part of our proposed
mechanism comes in: The Extractor. It extracts
the Actual Explanation of the CI system’s action
which is probably not graspable, but can presum-
ably be given, e.g., as a subsymbolic execution pro-
tocol preceding the action. The Actual Explanation
may be of the wrong kind—merely causal instead of
rationalizing—, but, from it, it should in principle be
possible to extract or infer the reasons for which the
system acted.
As a third part of the proposed mechanism,
we then add a Matchmaker, a mechanism which
matches the Extractor’s ungraspable accurate expla-
nation with the Confabulator’s graspable, at best
luckily accurate candidate explanations, and which
then outputs a Best Explanation as the explanation
of the CI system’s decision. In so doing, the Match-
maker accords to the following principles:
(Im)permissibility Preservation: The Best Expla-
nation is permissible if and only if the Actual
Explanation is permissible.
Explanatory Equivalence: The Best Explanation
is explanatory equivalent to the Actual Expla-
nation: Any output that can be explained, on
the basis of the Actual Explanation and in the
light of a given input, is explainable by the Best
Explanation in the light of the same input.
What allows for the possibility of the Matchmaker
is that there is explanatory underdetermination. See-
ing as there can be more than one explanation of the
same action, we can try to move from an ungras-
pable actual and thus accurate explanation to a corre-
sponding graspable explanation which preserves the
permissibility status of the actual explanation. By
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additionally requiring Explanatory Equivalence, we
get accuracy—or something close enough.9
5 Conclusion
We have argued that for trustworthiness, CI systems
have to do more than ‘just their job’: they have to
do what they are entrusted to do for permissible rea-
sons and to give rationalizing explanations of their
behavior which are accurate and graspable. We sup-
ported this claim by drawing parallels with trustwor-
thy human persons, and by applying our claims to a
hypothetical CI hiring system. We then presented
two challenges for designing trustworthy CI sys-
tems. Finally, we sketched a mechanism consisting
of three components—a Confabulator, an Extractor
and a Matchmaker—which could be used to gener-
ate sufficiently accurate and graspable rationalizing
Best Explanations for CI behavior.10
This may not be the only architecture to over-
come the fundamental challenges of trustworthy CI
design. Difficult obstacles along the way to building
our proposed mechanism are to be expected.11 How-
ever, we believe that trying out concrete and feasi-
ble proposals for building explainable CI systems is
essential to making any progress in this area at all.
So, designing the three components of our proposed
mechanism should be high on the research agenda
of those interested in explainable CI.
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